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ANSWERS: 19
  • I think had it been any other country than the United States that it would have only been one, maybe even none. But it was the US and isnt it their way to "go big"?
  • i remember my dad telling me that the japanese were utterly stunned with the results of the first bomb. they said that they didn't believe that the u.s. could do it again (whether due to morality or lack of engineering). once we did with assurances that we'd keep doing it, they surrendered.
  • We were pissed and we had the big gun.
  • The whole Japanese culture was so against surrender in any form. Death before dishonour was not just lip service to them.Surrender was dishonour. This earthly life was not the be all and end all to them. The devastation had to be on a huge repeatable scale to overturn that thinking. One didnt do it.+5 Mensan
  • http://www.answerbag.com/q_view/7702
  • Ever thought it is because we have no mercy and we dont care about killing others, since we dont consider them human.
  • I understand that the Japanese high command did not believe that there were only two atomic bombs. If they had believed that, they would have kept on fighting. They believed that America had an unlimited supply and that's why they surrendered. (I haven't a reference for this, but it is what I have read.)
  • It took two because they thought we only had one. If they had known that we in fact, had only two, they might have kept their resistance. . At the very least, the fact that we had two was excellent evidence of our ability to get #3 even if we did have one quite just yet.
  • The two bombs were of different designs. There is a suggestion that they didn't wait long enough for surrender after the first one because they wanted to check that the second one worked OK.
  • To surrender would bring dishonor to their culture, and they really didn't think we would dare to do something that devastating again, when we did they surrendered.
  • I know this doesn't help, but the only thing I can think is for the same reason why one was dropped: Irrationality.
  • Short answer: they were still not "convinced" after the first one. Also, the Soviets violated the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact and launched a surprise invasion of the Japanese colony in Manchuria, which gave more arguments for surrendering. 1) "The surrender of Japan in August 1945 brought World War II to a close. By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy effectively ceased to exist, and an Allied invasion of Japan was imminent. While publicly stating their intent to fight on to the bitter end, Japan's leaders at the Supreme War Council (the "Big Six") were privately making entreaties to the Soviet Union to mediate peace on terms favorable to the Japanese. The Soviets, meanwhile, were preparing to attack the Japanese, in fulfillment of their promise to the Americans and the British made at the Yalta Conference. On August 6 and 9, the Americans dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. Also on August 9, the Soviet Union launched a surprise invasion of the Japanese colony in Manchuria (Manchukuo), in violation of the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. These twin shocks caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene and order the Big Six to accept the terms the Allies had set down for ending the war in the Potsdam Declaration. After several more days of behind-the-scenes negotiations and a failed coup d'état, Hirohito gave a recorded radio address to the nation on August 15. In the radio address, called the Gyokuon-hōsō (Jewel Voice Broadcast), he read the Imperial Rescript on surrender, announcing to the Japanese populace the surrender of Japan." Source and further information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan 2) "The Potsdam ultimatum: On July 26, Truman and other allied leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. It was presented as an ultimatum and stated that without a surrender, the Allies would attack Japan, resulting in "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland". The atomic bomb was not mentioned in the communique. On July 28, Japanese papers reported that the declaration had been rejected by the Japanese government. That afternoon, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki declared at a press conference that the Potsdam Declaration was no more than a rehash (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration and that the government intended to ignore it (mokusatsu lit. "kill by silence"). The statement was taken by both Japanese and foreign papers as a clear rejection of the declaration. Emperor Hirohito, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to noncommittal Japanese peace feelers, made no move to change the government position. On July 31, he made clear to his advisor Kōichi Kido that the Imperial Regalia of Japan had to be defended at all costs. In early July, on his way to Potsdam, Truman had re-examined the decision to use the bomb. In the end, Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan. His stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring about a quick resolution of the war by inflicting destruction and instilling fear of further destruction in sufficient strength to cause Japan to surrender." "After the Hiroshima bombing, President Truman announced, If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth. The Japanese government still did not react to the Potsdam Declaration. Emperor Hirohito, the government, and the war council were considering four conditions for surrender: the preservation of the kokutai (Imperial institution and national polity), assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and demobilization, no occupation of the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or Formosa, and delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 5. At two minutes past midnight on August 9, Tokyo time, Soviet infantry, armor, and air forces had launched the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation. Four hours later, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army began preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Korechika Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace. Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Colonel Tibbets as commander of the 509th Composite Group on Tinian. Scheduled for August 11 against Kokura, the raid was moved earlier by two days to avoid a five day period of bad weather forecast to begin on August 10." "The United States expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August, with three more in September and a further three in October. On August 10, Major General Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum to General of the Army George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, in which he wrote that "the next bomb . . should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or August 18." On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President." There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in production until Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. "The problem now [August 13] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use."" "Until August 9, the war council had still insisted on its four conditions for surrender. On that day Hirohito ordered Kido to "quickly control the situation ... because the Soviet Union has declared war against us." He then held an Imperial conference during which he authorized minister Tōgō to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one condition, that the declaration "does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler." On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "of course." As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of the Throne, Hirohito recorded on August 14 his capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the next day despite a short rebellion by militarists opposed to the surrender. In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings: “Moreover, the enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the power to destroy many innocent lives and do incalculable damage. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.”" Source and further information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki
  • Germany had been working years on an Atomic bomb and sharing their knowledge with Japan who was also trying to build such bombs. So Japan's leaders knew how difficult it was to make an Atomic bomb and considered Hiroshima to be a lucky shot. Furthermore they considered it very unlikely that the USA had devoted the resources to build a second bomb. The damage and death toll was not unprecedented in Japan. Fire bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 killed 100,000 and Japan did not surrender. Hiroshima's loss in August 1945 was 140,000 and Japan did not surrender. Only after Nagasaki with 80,000 lost, did the Japanese believe. It was not the number dead but the number of bombs which convinced them. In fact a third bomb was scheduled for delivery on the 18th of August followed by three more in September and another three in October.
  • One would have gotten my attention! But men/ countries at war do not consider defeat. It has to be slammed over their head with incredible loss of life for them to even consider the possibility that they are wrong, out numbered, massive protest or defeated. They are arrogant! The populace that pays the price through the loss of their children, family members at some point say the risk is not worth it. I my opinion we have reached this point again with Afghanistan. No Nukes but the loss of our young people still hurts.
  • The second one was for all the American lives lost because of Japanese treachery. My grandpa was telling me about the killings and atrocities committed by the Japanese.
  • The Potsdam Declaration, the edict of the unconditional surrender of Japan, was given July 26th 1945. Ample warning was given for Japan to accept Potsdam. They refused. August 6th, a full 11 days later, came the bomb on Hiroshima, followed by yet more demands for Japan to accept the terms of Potsdam. Nagasaki did not get the bomb until a full three days later on August 9. For those who are unaware, Japan was the beligerent power in the asia war, upon its neighbors including China, Singapore, and The Phillipines in addition to attacking The United States. The war was not of U.S. making. The bomb, serving as an excuse for Japan to surrender without losing face, saved as many as ten million lives that would have been lost in a conventional invasion.
  • It was what some of you have said; but also, and perhaps more telling, it was a signal to the Soviet Union that America had the weapons and was not afraid to use them. It was convenient that we had a wartime enemy upon whom to demonstrate. Bikini drove the message home.
  • It's a little funny, but history tells us that it didn't take even one. A few more days and Japan would have surrendered.
  • becsause we're americans god dammit!

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